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Abstract. The aim of this paper is to improve on the model by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) by developing a non-linear model 
(that leads to interior rather than corner solutions) and by taking into account that different levels of income imply different reactions 
of fair-minded people. We suggest to modify the inequity-aversion utility function proposed by Fehr and Schmidt by taking into 
account not only the difference between players’ payoffs, but also their absolute value. This allows for a non-linear utility function 
where different stakes lead to different unique optimal interior solutions. 
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Introduction 
The inequity-aversion model by Fehr and Schmidt (FS onwards) represents one of the most 
important theoretical contributions to fairness studies. Its relevance is due to its simplicity and to the 
consistency of theoretical solutions with experimental evidence in different games. However, too 
much emphasis has been assigned to the second positive feature. In fact, the FS model fails to 
explain two relevant experimental results: the significant percentage of interior solutions in some 
distributions games (i.e. ultimatum game, Güth et al., 1982; and dictator game, Forsythe et al., 
1994) and the relevance of different monetary stakes in players’ decisional process (i.e. Slonim and 
Roth, 1998; Munier and Zaharia, 2002).  
The aim of this paper is to improve on the model by FS by developing a non-linear model 
(that leads to interior rather than corner solutions) and by taking into account that different levels of 
income imply different reactions of fair-minded people.    3
1. The model 
The inequity-aversion model by FS, in a two-player game, states that: 
 
( ) { } { } 0 , max 0 , max , j i i i j i i j i i x x x x x x x U − − − − = β α ,          i≠ j                                           (1) 
 
where: 
xi,j is the payoff of player i (or j)   
αi is a parameter of envy 
βi is a parameter of altruism 
0 < βi <1 and αi > βi  since the disutility that comes from a position of disadvantage is higher 
than the disutility that comes from a position of advantage; 
0 ≥ ∂ ∂ j i x U  iff   j i x x ≥  since the marginal utility of an increase in others’ income is positive 
if and only if they have a lower level of income with respect to subject i. 
 
A problem with this model is that, when applied, for example, to the Ultimatum Game and to 
the Dictator Game, it provides corner solutions depending on the value of β. In particular, when βi 
∈[0, 0.5), player i always maximizes her own payoff choosing not to transfer any sum to player j. 
On the other hand, when βi ∈(0.5, 1), player i always maximizes her own payoff choosing to share 
equally the total amount of money with player j. Finally, when βi  is equal to 0.5, player i  is 
indifferent between any distribution of the total payoff S where xi ∈[S/2, S]. In other words, this 
model is unable to clearly explain players’ optimal interior choices, that are the most common 
results (for a survey, Fehr and Camerer, 2003).   
The assumption of a linear utility function, which awards simplicity to the model, is the 
reason why interior solutions are not well defined. Kohler (2003) argues that ‘an increasing degree 
of difference aversion resolves the shortcoming that only two “focal” equilibria exist’.
1 However, 
his model holds only when the initial endowment S is normalized to 1. Consequently, this does not 
allow any analysis concerning different levels of endowment, which is our main concern. Moreover, 
if we consider the actual value of the initial endowment, the (for example) quadratic difference 
becomes extremely high with high numbers and even an almost selfish Proposer will decide to 
transfer half of the sum. 
To reach our goal, we suggest to modify the initial inequity-aversion utility function (1) by 
taking into account not only the difference between player i ‘s and player j’s payoffs, but also their 
                                                 
1 Kohler, 2003, p.7.   4
absolute value.
2 This allows for a non-linear utility function where different stakes lead to different 
unique optimal interior solutions. Our utility function is: 
 
( ) () ( ) ( ) j j i i i i j i i j i x x x f x x x f x f x x V , , , − − − − = β α               (2) 
 
We assume that the second term of the previous function is increasing with respect to the 
difference and decreasing with respect to the value of xi. At the same time, the third term is   
increasing with respect to the difference and decreasing with respect to the value of xj.  
 
We consider the following form of the utility function presented in equation (2) to analyse the 








































α ,    i≠ j.    (3) 
 



















































In equation (4), we consider the utility of player i when her payoff is lower than player j’s 
payoff. We assume that the level of xi influences the disutility due to the payoffs’ difference. In 
particular, the higher the level of xi, the lower the discomfort due to the difference. However, we 
assume that subjects’ concern for their income as a weight of the difference is not equal among the 
population. This is represented by the parameter γi  [ ] 1 , 0 ∈ . When  1 = i γ , player i's income has the 
same relevance as the difference. When  0 = i γ , player i's income has no relevance and the model 
corresponds to the model by FS. Obviously, for a given value of αi, xi and xj, the higher γi, the 
higher the level of the utility.  
The lowest level of equation (4) is reached when  0 = i x . In this case: 
 
                                                 
2 It comes from common sense that the discomfort due to inequality decreases as the income of the worse-off player increases. 
Consider, for example, two subjects in two different scenarios. In the first case, player A has 10 euro and player B 0 euro. In the 
second case player A has 1000 euro and player B 990 euro. Player A will suffer more in the first situation.  
i j x x >                                                                                      (4) 
j i x x ≥                                                                                       (5)   5
( ) j i i x U α − =                                                                             (6) 
 
and the higher αi the higher the disutility (see Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. 
























 It is interesting to notice that the corner points of our function ( 0 = i x ,  j i x x = ) correspond 




                                                 







































In equation (5), we consider the utility of player i when her payoff is higher than player j’s 
payoff. As in FS, player i’ s utility is negatively influenced by the payoffs difference. However, this 
difference has a decreasing ‘weight’ with respect to xj.  
 
The lowest level of Figure 1 is reached when xj is equal to 0. In this case: 
 
() i i i x U β − = 1                                                                           (7) 
 
This means that when  0 = j x , player i’s utility is a weighted function of xi. The higher βi, the 
lower the utility (see Figure 3).   7
Figure 3. 


























 Also in this case, the corner points of our function ( 0 , = = j j i x x x ) correspond to the corner 
points of FS’s function, whatever the level of σi (see Figure 4).  








































As for FS, αi > βi and  1 0 < ≤ i β .  
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The marginal utility of xi is positive and decreasing, while in FS it is positive and constant.  
















                                                              (10) 
 
Consider now the first derivative of equation (5) with respect to  xi and the first and second 
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The implication is that both a higher value of xi and a higher value of xj lead to a higher value 
of i's utility function.  
   10
2. Application to Dictator and Ultimatum Games 
Consider a Dictator Game where the total sum to be divided between the Dictator and the 
Receiver is equal to k. In this game where the only active player is the Dictator, the utility function 
to be considered is her utility function. Since we are not analysing a mini Dictator Game (see for 
example, Abbink, Sadrieh and Zamir, 2004) but a traditional Dictator Game, we consider only the 
part of the utility function where the Dictator has a payoff that is equal or higher than the payoff of 
the Receiver. Consequently, the sum that the Dictator transfers to the Receiver is equal to s ∈[0, 
2
k
]. We can rewrite equation (5) as follows: 
 









































In FS the value of  i β determines the optimal transfer to the Receiver. In this case, βi, σi and k 
determine the optimal value of s. However, this modified version of their model allows unique 
optimal interior solutions, given the value of the parameters.  
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Let’s now consider a Generalized Dictator Game where the Dictators decides to transfer a 
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Finally, consider now an Ultimatum Game, where: 
- player i is the Proposer; 
- player j is the Responder; 
- s is the offer of the Proposer; 
- k is the sum to be divided. 
if   l i ≥ β  
if  h< l i < β  
 
if   h i ≤ β  
if   75 . 0 ≥ i β  
if  0.33< 75 . 0 < i β  
if   33 . 0 ≤ i β    12
Since the Proposer will never offer to the Responder more than a half of the total sum k, the 



















α ,                                   i≠ j.              (16) 
 
The Responder will accept any sum that provides a positive value of equation (16), since the 
utility of her rejection of the Proposer’s offer provides a level of utility equal to 0. The Responder 
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≡ <            (17) 
 
The value of s’ depends positively both on the level of  j α  and on the value of k.  
 
The utility function of the Proposer is: 
 
















β                                                         (18) 
 
In equilibrium, the Proposer who knows the type ( j α  ) of the Responder, will offer:  
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if   q i ≤ β    13
with: 
 
k r i i i i γ α α α 4 4 4 1
2 + + + =  
 




















Our modified version of the model by FS is consistent with the empirical evidence. The 
results obtained by Slonim and Roth (1998) and by Munier and Zaharia (2002) show that the higher 
the sum to be divided (k), the lower in percentage the minimum accepted transfer and, at the same 
time, the optimal transfer (s) to the Responder. We provide an example to show that this is the case 
in this modified version of the model by FS, but not in their original model. 
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For 5 . 0 , 1 = = i i β α , the function is depicted in Figure 5. 
if   75 . 0 ≥ i β  
if  0.565< 75 . 0 < i β  
if   565 . 0 ≤ i β  
5 < i x               
























If player i is a Proposer, the value of (1 – s) that maximizes her utility function is 7.9. If she is 
a Responder, the minimum accepted transfer (s) is 3.03. 
 


























































5 < i x 0              

























If player i is a Proposer, the value of (1 – s) that maximizes her utility function is 88.4. If she 
is a Responder, the minimum accepted transfer (s) is 20. 
If we compare the results, we can notice that when k is higher, a Proposer maximizes her 
utility by keeping a higher percentage of the total sum (88.4% against 79%) and a Responder’s 
utility goes to 0 with a lower percentage of the total sum (20% against 30%).
4  
 
                                                 
4 When k = 10, σi =0.2,  1 = i α ,  9 . 0 = i β , the value of 1-s that maximizes the Proposer’s utility function is now about 5.5. When 
k = 10,  σi =0.2,  1 = i α ,  2 . 0 = i β , the value of 1-s that maximizes the Proposer’s utility function is 10. When k = 10, γi =0.1, 
2 = i α ,  5 . 0 = i β , the value of s that makes the Responder’s utility function equal to 0 is about 3.7. This suggests that a higher 
level of altruism implies a lower level of 1-s to maximize the Proposer’s utility. On the other hand, a higher level of envy implies that 
a higher level of s is required for the Responder to have a positive utility.  
   16
3. Application to Public Good Games 
In this section we analyse how fair-minded people behave in a Pubic Good Game. There are n 
> 2 players who have to decide how to invest their initial endowment y. They can either keep the 
whole sum or invest (gi) part of it (or the total sum) in a public good whose return is a  ( ) 1 , 1
n ∈ . 







j i n i g a g y g g x
1
1,...,                                               (19) 
 
Since  a < 1, any contribution implies a loss of (1-a). Consequently, the selfish Homo 
Oeconomicus always find it profitable not to contribute. 
  However, an interesting feature of our model is that fair-minded people may decide to 
cooperate. Without loss of generality we consider player 1 as the reference player, and we compare 
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If we compare (20) with (21), we obtain respectively the loss (22) and the gain (23) due to 
contribution: 
 













































































g a ag g y
g g
n
g a ag g y
g g
n






















































































g a ag g y
g g
n


















             (23)  
 
When (23) is greater than (22), player 1 will contribute.  
 
Consider now the effect of  1 α ,  1 β  and a on the loss and the gain. When  1 α  increases, the loss 
increases and it becomes less profitable for player 1 to cooperate. The opposite happens when  1 β  
increases: the gain increases and it becomes more profitable for player 1 to cooperate. The effect of 
an increase of a is less obvious. While the loss (equation 22) decreases, the gain (equation 23) 
increases. However, the final effect on contribution is positive.  This means that the decrease of the 
loss is higher than the decrease of the gain. 
 
Consider now a situation where the subjects can punish players who do not contribute to the 












ji j i i i p c p z g a ag g y x
1 21
                      (24) 
 
where: 
c = cost of each unit of punishment 
z = yield of each unit of punishment 
pji = units of punishment given by player j to player i  
pij = units of punishment given by player i to player j 
 
Without loss of generality, we analyse a 3-player game in order to avoid complex 
computations.  Player 1 is a ‘cooperative enforcer’
5 (she cooperates and she punishes a non-
cooperative player), player 2 does not contribute to the provision of the public good and player 3 is 
a cooperative subject (she cooperates, but she does not punish non cooperators). We assume that g1 
= g3 and g2 = 0.  
The payoff of player 1 when she decides to punish player 2 is: 
                                                 
5 Fehr and Schmidt, 1999, p.19.   18
 
12 1 1 1 2 cp ag g y x − + − =                                                         (25) 
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on the other hand, the payoff of player 1 when she decides not to punish player 2 is: 
 
1 1 1 2ag g y x + − =                                                                   (27) 
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12                                                                              (33) 
 
The first two constraints mean that the player 1 cannot pay for punishment more than her 
income and punishment cannot provide a negative income to player 2. The third constraint means 
that player 1’s payoff after punishment cannot be higher than player’s 2 payoff. 
Consider equation (30) again. The value of punishment assigned by player 1 to player 2 ( p12) 
increases as the cost of punishment (c) decreases, the rent of punishment (z) decreases and envy of 
player 1 (α1) increases. 
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4. Application to Gift Exchange Games 
This game describes the principal-agent relation in an incomplete contracts contest. In the first 
stage, the Employer (the principal) offers a wage w ∈ [w,  w] (where w > 0) to the Worker (the 
agent). The Worker decides whether to accept or not. If she rejects, both players receive nothing. In 
the second stage, the Worker decides her effort e  ∈ [e,  e] (where e > 0). The payoff of  the 
Employer and of the Worker are respectively xE and xW: 
 
w ve xE − =                                                                             (34) 
 
() e c w xW − =                                                                          (35) 
 
where: 
w = wage proposed by the Employer 
v = marginal value of effort for the Employer 
e = effort chosen by the Worker 
c(e) = effort cost for the Worker 
We assume a positive income for both players when e = e. This means that: 
 
e v w ≤   or      
e
w




() e c w ≥  
 
Consider now a situation where  W E x x >  at any feasible effort level. A fair-minded worker 
will always choose e = e when this effort level provides a positive utility. When  0 ≤ W U at any level 
of e, the Worker will never accept to work for the Employer. 
When  E W x x > at e, the Worker may decide to increase her effort to reduce the difference 
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*                                 (38) 
 
When βi  and w increase e* increases as well. This result is consistent with the experimental 
evidence. In Fehr et al.(1993), a higher wage (w) corresponds to a higher effort (e*). 
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5. Application to Trust Games 
It is a two-stage game with two participants (the Investor and the Trustee). In the first stage 
the Investor can invest the whole initial endowment S or a part of it by sending any amount y 
(between 0 and S) to the Trustee. The experimenter triples the amount sent to the Trustee such that 
she receives 3y. In the second stage the Trustee can send part of the investment (any amount 
between 0 and 3y) back to the Investor. 
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where: 
y = sum sent to the Trustee by the Investor 
z = sum sent back to the Investor by the Trustee 
s = each player’s initial endowment 
 




T T T T y s s y
z
σ
σ σ β σ 1 2 1
*
+ + + − −
=                             (40) 
 
This result means that the sum the Trustee sends back to the Investor depends positively on 
the sum received by the Investor and on the Trustee’s degree of altruism. It can explain the results 
obtained by Berg et al. (1995): when y is equal to 0.5S, z is a bit less than y.
6 Moreover, z increases 
as y increases, as a sort of positive reciprocity between the Investor and the Trustee.   
 
                                                 
6 When s = 10, y =5, σT = 0.1, βT = 0.8, z* = 5.   23
Summary and conclusions 
Fehr and Schmidt assume that fair-minded people exist and they provide a model that 
explains extreme behavior. In this paper we provide a non-linear utility function of fair-minded 
people to explain interior solutions. In particular, we assume that the disutility due to unfair 
distribution of outcomes is influenced not only by the difference between the payoffs but also by the 
absolute value of the payoff of each player. This hypothesis looks plausible and allows to explain 
the behavior of players involved in Ultimatum Games. In addition, the model is consistent with the 
empirical evidence also in other games (i.e. Public Good Game, Dictator Game and Gift Exchange 
Game, Trust Game). 
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